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At the height of the British colonial power in the late 19th Century, the future American President Woodrow Wilson observed that Westminster parliamentary government had become ‘the world’s fashion.’ The UK political majoritarian system was exported with some variations to Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean region along with other Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia, as well as, with differing levels of success, many post-colonial nations in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia.
All Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions and those of the Overseas Territories are based on the Westminster model of government, in the region the key aspects of the Westminster system, combined with changes inherited from British colonial practice, are embedded in the various independence constitutions. One of the key elements in the Westminster system is the combination of legislative and executive power in the hands of the government party; the party that commands a majority in the (lower House of Parliament)1 is entitled to form a government. Despite calls for reform over the decades since independence, there has been little (significant) reform of the original constitutions made at the time of independence.
The Westminster parliamentary style has been criticized over time, such criticism strengthened in the latter half of the twentieth century and, initiated under the Blair administration (1997 to 2007), the British constitution underwent a series of major reforms through the latter part of the 20th century and early 21st century, although, almost uniquely throughout the world, it still remains “unwritten”. The paper questions whether those reforms have impacted the way in which reform of constitutions in the Caribbean Region have been or will be carried out.
This paper looks at the original approach by the Whitehall Government to the Independent Commonwealth Constitutions of the Caribbean countries, including the difference between roles of the Attorneys General and Directors of Public Prosecutions, where in some jurisdictions the Attorney General does not have oversight of criminal prosecutions, as opposed to the role of the Attorney General in the UK, who maintains an active role in that capacity. Why the difference in approach? This is also examined in the context of the more modern constitutional reforms in the Overseas Territories.
The paper also examines how the development of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has evolved since its inception, and studies the implications of the Privy Council decision from Jamaica with regard to public consultation, or lack of it. Again why different treatment to the UK where no referenda have been called for constitutional change, rather the process is generally put out to public consultation exercises, some of which seem relatively restricted to a limited number of stakeholders. Also looked at is the process of other appointments and how they are handled in the Caribbean Jurisdictions compared to the UK. Have constitutional reforms kept pace with expectations?
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University College of the Cayman Islands
